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SIXTH AMENDMENT- MIRANDA RIGHTS OF JUVENILES
Fare v. Michael C., 99 S. Ct. 2560 (1979).
In a case decided this past term, Fare v. Michael
C.,' the Supreme Court refused to extend the scope
of Miranda2 rights in juvenile cases. The Court in
Fare ruled that a juvenile's request to see his pro-
bation officer was not equivalent to an invocation
of his right to discontinue interrogation, thus lim-
iting the mandatory invocation of Miranda rights
to situations where the defendant has requested an
attorney.3 Because the Court believed only an at-
torney could effectively protect the rights of a
defendant, even in a juvenile case, it held that a
request for someone other than an attorney did not
deserve the status of a per se invocation of the right
to remain silent.4 Having determined that the per
se rule was inappropriate, the Court went on to
examine the facts of Fare in light of the constitu-
tionally mandated voluntariness standard. The
Court held that incriminating statements made by
Michael C., the juvenile defendant in this case,
after his request to see his probation officer, were
admissible because he had voluntarily and intelli-
gently waived his rights.
5
The basis of Michael C.'s objection to the ad-
missibility of statements he made during interro-
gation was the Court's landmark decision in Mi-
randa v. Arizona.6 In Miranda the Court set out
specific warnings which must be given to an ac-
cused held for custodial interrogation. 7 After re-
ceiving the warnings if the suspect indicates in any
way that he desires to remain silent,8 or if he asks
I 99 S. Ct. 2560 (1979).
2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
399S. Ct. at 2568-71.
4 id.
5 Id. at 2573.
6 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
7 The Court held that "[tihe person must be warned
that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement
he does make may be used as evidence against him, and
that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either
retained or appointed." Id. at 444. This language has
been adopted almost verbatim by most police depart-
ments as part of their standard operating procedure.
8 The Court stated:
Once warnings have been given, the subsequent
procedure is clear. If the individual indicates in any
manner, at any time prior to or during questioning,
for an attorney,9 he automatically invokes his fifth
amendment rights, and further interrogation is
barred. Even if the defendant does not fall within
these per se categories, he is required to knowingly
and intelligently waive his fifth amendment rights
or else his statements are inadmissible.'0 If there is
a question about the adequacy of the waiver, and
the interrogation nevertheless continued, the state
bears a heavy burden to prove that waiver was
properly made."
The present Court has been reluctant to construe
the provisions of Miranda broadly.'2 This reluctance
was again evident this term in Fare v. Michael C.'
3
Defendant Michael C., a sixteen-year-old juvenile,
was arrested on Feburary 4, 1976, on suspicion of
a murder. After receiving his Miranda warnings, the
defendant stated that he understood his rights and
that he wanted to see his probation officer. 4 Police
refused his request, but again asked him if he
wanted the assistance of counsel.' 5 The defendant
apparently consented to further interrogation with-
out an attorney, although the competence of his
consent was questionable. 16 The Court, in holding
that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation
must cease. At this point he has shown that he
intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege;
any statement taken after the person invokes his
privilege cannot be other than the product of com-
pulsion, subtle or otherwise.
Id. at 473-74.
9 Id. at 474. According to the Court, if the individual
requests an attorney, the police must wait until he has
had a chance to talk to the attorney before they continue
the interrogation.
'o Concerning the issue of waiver, the Court stated:
If the interrogation continues without the presence
of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy
burden rests on the government to demonstrate that
the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived
his privilege against self-incrimination and his right
to retained or appointed counsel.
Id. at 475.11 Id.
12 See generally Lederer, Miranda v. Arizona-The Law
Today, 78 MIL. L. REV. 107 (1977); Comment, 10 SUFFOLK
U.L. REV. 1141 (1976).
" 99 S. Ct. 2560 (1979).
14 Id. at 2564.
15 /d.
16 id.
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that consent was given, cited the following testi-
mony:
"Q.... Do you understand all of these rights as I
have explained them to you?
"A. Yeah.
"Q. Okay, do you wish to give up your right to
remain silent and talk to us about this murder?
"A. What murder? I don't know about no murder.
"Q. I'll explain to you which one it is if you want to
talk to us about it.
"A. Yeah, I might talk to you.
"Q. Do you want to give up your right to have an
attorney present here while we talk about it?
"A. Can I have my probation officer here?
"Q. Well I can't get a hold of your probation officer
right now. You have the right to an attorney.
"A. How I know you guys won't pull no police
officer in and tell me he's an attorney?
"Q. Huh?
"A. [How I know you guys won't pull no police
officer in and tell me he's an attorney?l
"Q. Your probation officer is Mr. Christiansen.
"A. Yeah.
"Q. Well I'm not going to call Mr. Christiansen
tonight. There's a good chance we can talk to him
later, but I'm not going to call him right now. If you
want to talk with us without an attorney present,
you can. If you don't want to, you don't have to.
But if you want to say something, you can, and if
you don't want to say something you don't have to.
That's your right. You understand that right?
"A. Yeah.
"Q. Okay, will you talk to us without an attorney
present?
"A. Yeah I want to talk to you."
' 7
After this discussion Michael made statements con-
necting him to the crime. Only then was his pro-
bation officer called.'8
At trial, the defendant objected to the admission
of the statements, arguing that by requesting the
presence of his probation officer, he invoked his
fifth amendment rights.' 9 The juvenile court re-
17 Id. (emphasis deleted).
18 Id.
9 These fifth amendment rights were made applicable
to the states through the fourteenth amendment in Mal-
loy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. I (1964). Procedural rights in
general were made applicable to juvenile proceedings in
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). Gault is a landmark case
that emphasizes the need for adequate procedural safe-
guards for minors. Originally, juvenile courts were set up
as noncriminal, nonadversary courts, with no attorneys,
in order to remove the stigma associated with crime from
the proceedings. The state was to act as the substitute
parent in an effort to rehabilitate, rather than to punish,
the youth. Unfortunately, until Cauti, this left juveniles
without procedural protection. See Seigel, Senna & Libby,
jected this argument. 20 Viewing the totality of the
circumstances, the court held that Michael had
voluntarily and intelligently waived his rights.
2 1
The state court of appeals affirmed the trial
court's ruling on the Miranda issue, declining to
give a request for a probation officer the same
status as a request for an attorney or for one's
parents.Y2 The defendant appealed to the Supreme
Court of California.
The California Supreme Court reversed, "2 hold-
ing that Michael's conduct was indistinguishable
from an adult's request for an attorney"4 and,
therefore, subsequent interrogation was improper
regardless of the circumstances. The court relied
heavily on its prior decision in People v. Burton
25
where a juvenile made several requests to see his
parents that were refused even though his parents
were present at the police station. The Burton cdurt
held that subsequent statements were inadmissible
as a matter of law because the request for a parent
indicated a desire to halt interrogation. The court
pointed out that a parent is the adult to whom a
child most naturally turns for advice and protec-
tion.26
In Fare, the California court held that ajuvenile
would place a similar type of trust in his probation
officer, and therefore the rationale of Burton was
Legal Aspects of the Juvenile Justice Process: An Overview of
Current Practices and Law, 12 NEw ENGLAND L. REv. 223-
68 (1976); Davis, Justice for the Juvenile: The Decision to
Arrest and Due Process, 1971 DUKE L.J. 913 (1971).
The Court in Fare explicitly stated that the question of
whether Miranda rights are applicable to juvenile pro-
ceedings has not been decided. 99 S. Ct. at 2567 n.4.
20 The opinion of the juvenile court was not published.
However, the court of appeals quoted extensively from
the opinionin In re Michael C., 135 Cal. Rptr. 762, 765-
66 (1977). Further indications of the trial court's disposal
of the case appear in the Supreme Court's opinion. 99 S.
Ct. 2560, 2565, 2573, 2576 n.2.
21 135 Cal. Rptr. at 765-66
2
2In re Michael C., 135 Cal. Rptr. 762 (1977).
' In re Michael C., 21 Cal. 3d 471, 146 Cal. Rptr. 358,
579 P.2d 7 (1978).
24 Id. at 476, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 361, 579 P.2d at 9.
6 Cal. 3d 375, 99 Cal. Rptr. 1,491 P.2d 793 (1971).
The court in Burton went on to state:
For adults, removed from the protective ambit of
parental guidance, the desire for help naturally
manifests in a request for an attorney. For minors,
it would seem that the desire for help naturally
manifests in a request for parents. It would certainly
severely restrict the "protective devices" required by
Miranda in cases where the suspects are minors if the
only ... invocation of the privilege is the call for an
attorney.
Id. at 382, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 5, 491 P.2d at 797.
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analogous. Moreover, the court noted that the
probation officer had a statutory duty to act in the
interests of the child in much the same fashion as
a parent.28 It concluded that police are required to
discontinue interrogations in situations where the
juvenile requests a conference with his probation
officer until after the juvenile has had a chance to
consult with him.2
The United States Supreme Court, however,
refused to extend Miranda's absolute requirements
to a request for one's probation officer.as The Court
regarded the Miranda safeguards as useful to both
the state and the accused insofar as they told police
exactly what to do when an accused asks for an
attorney.3' In the case of a request for an attorney,
the benefits of an exact rule outweighed the burden
of the suppression of trustworthy evidence, some of
which would be admissible under traditional tests
of voluntariness.3 2 To extend these requirements to
requests for probation officers, however, would in-
crease the burdens on police without a concomitant
increase in benefits to the accused.2 4
This conclusion was based upon the Court's
emphasis on the unique role of an attorney in
protecting the rights of an accused person undergo-
ing interrogation2 *4 The Court reasoned that unlike
a probation officer, a lawyer was a skilled advocate
who knew his client's rights and the consequences
of statements made to police.35 Also, conversations
27 21 Cal. 3d at 478, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 362, 579 P.2d at
9, 10.
28The California Welfare & Institutions Code pro-
vides:
Except where waived by the probation officer,
judge or referee and the minor, the probation officer
shall be present in court to represent the interests of
each person who is the subject of a petition to
declare such person to be a ward or dependent child
upon all hearings or rehearings of his case, and shall
furnish to the court such information and assistance
as the court may require. If so ordered, he shall take
charge of such person before and after any hearing
or rehearing.
It shall be the duty of the probation officer to
prepare for every hearing on the disposition of a
case... a social study of the minor, containing such
matters as may be relevant to a proper disposition
of the case. Such social study shall include a rec-
ommendation for the disposition of the case.
CAL. WELF. & INsT. CODE § 280 (West 1978).
2 21 Cal. 3d at 477, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 362, 479 P.2d at
11.
a 99 S. Ct. 2560 (1979).




3 Id. at 2569-71.
with a lawyer were protected by the attomey-client
privilege, whereas a conversation between a de-
fendant and his probation officer would be admis-
sible in evidence against the defendant.36 Addition-
ally, the lawyer would not experience the conflict
of interest that was inherent in a probation officer's
position.37 For example, the probation officer had
a duty to investigate the incident involving his
juvenile charge and had the powers of an officer of
the peace.ss The Court held that these duties were
"incompatible with the view that he may act as a
counselor to a juvenile accused of a crime."3 9 For
these reasons, the Court refused to establish a
general rule placing a request for a probation
officer on the same constitutional plane as a request
for an attorney.
40
Although the Court refused to rule that Mi-
chael's request was a per se invocation of his right
to discontinue interrogation, there remained the
question of whether, under the circumstances of
this case, he had voluntarily and intelligently
waived his right to remain silent. 4' If the totality of
the circumstances indicated that Michael had not
effectively waived that right, his statements were
inadmissible in court.' The Court noted that the
age of the defendant was only one consideration in
this factual determination . Other factors include
experience, education, background, and intelli-
gence.44 Upon reviewing the record, the Court
found that Michael's waiver was made voluntarily
and intelligently." Accordingly, the decision of the
C~tlifornia Supreme Court was reversed.
Justice Marshall, with whom Justices Brennan
and Stevens joined, dissented. Marshall argued
that Miranda should be construed more broadly to
effectuate its intended purpose of vitiating the
coercive pressures of custodial interrogation. 46 Mar-
shall discussed several cases which involved the
protection of juvenile rights as support for his
proposition that juveniles are particularly suscep-
361d. at 2569.
Id.
' Section 283 of the California Welfare & Institutions
Code provides, "Every probation officer ... shall have
the powers and authority conferred by law upon peace
officers.... " CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 283 (West
1978).
*39 9 S. Ct. at 2569 n.5.
4"Id. at 2571.
4, Id. at 2571-72.
42 See note 10 supra.
4, 99S. Ct. at 2572.
44 id.
45Id. at 2573.
46 Id. at 2574-75 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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tible to the pressures against which Miranda was
designed to protect.47 Because of this susceptibility,
he would have extended the per se protection
whenever a youth requested the counsel of an adult
who had a duty to look after his interests. 4 Mar-
shall reiterated much of what the Supreme Court
of California had said regarding the value of a per
se rule in juvenile cases.49 According to Marshall,
a request for a probation officer was a clear indi-
cation of a youth's desire to exercise his right to
remain silent until he talks to a trusted adult.50
Requiring a statement of desire to remain silent
which follows an exact verbal formula would aid
the knowledgeable juvenile while leaving the naive
juvenile unprotected. 51 Furthermore, the case-by-
case approach advocated by the majority did not
provide enough guidance for police and left the
juvenile insufficiently protected because that ap-
proach failed to enunciate specific and definite
guidelines.
52
Justice Powell also dissented, although he agreed
47 Marshall relied on In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967),
Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962), and Haley v.
Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
In Haley, the defendant, a 15-year-old black youth,
was arrested in connection with a robbery and shooting.
He was kept incommunicado by police for five days
before he was allowed to see his mother. His lawyer was
refused admittance. Eventually a confession was elicited.
The Court held that the confession could not stand
because it was clearly not voluntary. The Court empha-
sized the special care and counseling required to protect
the rights of a child in interrogation adequately. 332 U.S.
at 601.
In Gallegos, a 14-year-old suspected of murder was
arrested and held for five days without seeing any friendly
adult. The Court held the confessions inadmissible even
though there was no prolonged questioning or physical
abuse, noting that any statements are suspect when made
in secret, inquisitorial surroundings. The fourteenth
amendment condemns such practices because
[the youth] cannot be compared with an adult in
full possession of his senses and knowledgeable of
the consequences of his admissions. He would have
no way of knowing what the consequences of his
confession were without advice as to his rights-
from someone concerned with securing him those
rights-and without the aid of more mature judg-
ment as to the steps he should take in the predica-
ment in which he found himself. A lawyer or an
adult relative or friend could have given the peti-
timer the protection which his own immaturity
could not.
370 U.S. at 54. In re Gault is discussed in note 19 supra.
4s 99 S. Ct. 2574 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
41 Id. at 2574-75. See note 22 and accompanying text
supra.
99 S. Ct. at 2574 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
r" Id.
2 Id. at 2574 n.2.
with the majority that the per se requirements of
Miranda should not be extended to this type of
request. "s Powell cited the record which showed
that Michael was "immature, emotional and un-
educated" and was crying during the interroga-
tion.5 Michael also had extensive family problems.
His probation officer testified that he had told
Michael to call him, "at any time he has a police
contact, even if they stop him and talk to him on
the street."' In light of these facts, Powell con-
cluded that the confession was not voluntary under
the standards established by the Court.55
II
The Court's refusal in Fare to extend the rigid
requirements of a per se rule is not surprising. The
current Court seems less concerned with the dan-
gers of psychological coercion resulting in invol-
untary confessions than did the Miranda Court.s
The prevailing judicial attitude toward Miranda is
exemplified by the exception, developed in a recent
line of cases, which allows the prosecution to use
incriminating statements that were illegally ob-
tained under Miranda standards as long as the
statements are used only to impeach the testimony
of the defendant on cross-examination. Harris v.
New York,5 7 the case in which this impeachment
rule was first established, and Michigan v. Tuckers8
s Id. at 2575-76. (Powell, J., dissenting).
54Id.
55Id. at 2577.
s6See generally Lederer, note 12 supra; Comment, 10
SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 1141 (1976).
57 401 U.S. 222 (1971). Although Miranda warnings are
absolute prerequisites for use of defendant's statements
in the state's case-in-chief, the Court allowed use of them
on cross-examination if they were trustworthy by tradi-
tional legal standards. The Court reasoned that to hold
otherwise was to give the defendant the right to commit
perjury. Id. at 225, 226.
The dissent in Harris pointed out that the exception
for impeachment testimony would effectively take away
a defendant's freedom to take the stand without fear of
the use of illegal evidence. Police would not be deterred
from respecting a defendant's Miranda rights, and even if
they were, the mainstay of the privilege was not deter-
rence, but rather effectively preserving the right against
self-incrimination. Id. at 231.
58417 U.S. 433 (1974). In that case, the defendant
raped and severely beat a 43-year-old woman. Incrimi-
nating statements were elicited after the defendant said
he understood his rights, but that he did not want an
attorney. The only flaw was that be had not been told of
his right to free counsel. The Court, after reviewing the
long history of the right to be free from self-incrimination,
held that the Miranda violation in Tucker did not infringe
defendant's fifth amendment rights, but rather were only
violations of the prophylactic rules of Miranda.
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a subsequent case, involved situations in which
police failed to give the defendant complete warn-
ings. In Oregon v. Hass55 the impeachment exception
was expanded beyond mere failure to give com-
plete warnings and applied to a situation where a
defendant's confession was made before he had
waived his rights. The recurring theme underlying
these cases is that the traditional test of voluntari-
ness is sufficient to assure against coerced loss of
the fifth amendment right against self-incrimina-
tion.
The sole rationale which the Court currently
recognizes for continuing to impose the rigid re-
quirements of Miranda is deterrence. The Court's
emphasis on deterrence is apparent in the following
language from Michigan v. Tucker:
The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule nec-
essarily assumes that the police have engaged in
willful, or at the very least negligent, conduct which
has deprived the defendant of some right. By refus-
ing to admit evidence gained as a result of such
conduct, courts hope to instill in those particular
investigating officers, or in their future counterparts,
a greater degree of care toward the rights of an
accused. Where the official action was pursued in
complete good faith, however, the deterrence ration-
ale loses much of its force.')
If exclusion will not effect police conduct, the Court
is reluctant to extend procedural protection.
The heavy emphasis of the present Court on
considerations of deterrence is in contrast with the
earlier rationale given for exclusion. Previous
Courts were more concerned with the government's
obligation to play fairly with the accused6 1 and to
59 420 U.S. 714 (1975). The suspect was given proper
Miranda warnings but made incriminating statements
while alone with police after he had requested an attor-
ney. Although the Court found that the statements were
inadmissible under Miranda, since they were made in a
police car on the way to the station, after the suspect
requested an attorney and was told that he would have
to wait until they arrived at the station to talk to an
attorney, nevertheless, the Court allowed the testimony
under the impeachment exception.
60417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974).
6 See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952),
in which Justice Frankfurter stated:
Use of involuntary verbal confessions in State crim-
inal trials is constitutionally obnoxious not only
because of their unreliability. They are inadmissible
under the Due Process Clause even though state-
ments contained in them may be independently
established as true. Coerced confessions offend the
community's sense of fair play and decency.
Id. at 173.
develop its case primarily from evidence other than
the defendant's confessions.62 Although the deci-
sion in Fare did not rest simply on the ground that
deterrent purposes would not be served by the
admission of Michael's confessions, it is consistent
with the Court's reluctance to expand Miranda
beyond what is absolutely required by a deterrence
rationale.
Strong arguments have been advanced advocat-
ing a reversal of this trend, especially in the area of
juvenile interrogations.63 Tests have indicated that
minors are particularly susceptible to the coercive
pressures of police methods with which the Court
in Miranda was concerned.' Other studies show
that frequently juveniles do not even understand
the Miranda warnings."s For example, a study pub-
lished in the San Diego Law Review concluded
that eighty-one of the eighty-six juveniles observed
who voluntarily waived their rights did not con-
sciously and fully understand them.6 6 Minimum
Miranda protection under these circumstances does
not ensure that elicited statements are trustworthy
and freely given. Even when they are aware of
their rights, many juveniles will waive them, in
spite of their desire not to speak. 7 Youths also
cooperate with police because making a favorable
&2 See Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949), in which
Justice Frankfurter stated:
To turn the detention of an accused into a process
of wrenching from him evidence which could not
be extorted in open court with all its safeguards, is
so grave an abuse of the power of arrest as to offend
the procedural standards of due process.
This is so because it violates the underlying prin-
ciple in our enforcement of the criminal law. Ours
is the accusatorial as opposed to the inquisitorial
system. Such has been the characteristic of Anglo-
American criminal justice since it freed itself from
practices borrowed by the Star Chamber.... Under
our system society carries the burden of proving its
charge against the accused not out of his own
mouth. It must establish its case, not by interroga-
tion of the accused even under judicial safeguards,
but by evidence independently secured through
skillful investigation.
Id at 54.
' See Comment, The Interrogated Juvenile: Caveat Confes-
sor?, 24 HASTINOS L.J. 413 (1973).
'4 Id. at 419-23.
Ferguson & Douglas, A Study ofJuvenile Waiver, 7 SAN
DIEGO L. REv. 39 (1970). Similar findings were made in
general population studies in Colorado. See Leiken, Police
Interrogation in Colorado: The Implementation of Miranda, 47
DEN. L.J. 1 (1970).
See Ferguson & Douglas, supra note 65, at 53.
Comment, The Interrogated Juvenile: Caveat Confessor?,
supra note 63, at 419.
[Vol. 70
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impression on police is often crucial in determining
how their case will be handled."s
A per se requirement that interrogation cease
where a minor indicates in a specific, natural way
a desire not to be questioned, such as an affirmative
request for his probation officer, would at least
partially alleviate these problems by giving greater
recognition to the youth's attempt to exercise his
rights. The request for a probation officer is partic-
ularly suitable for a per se rule because such a
request almost invariably constitutes an indication
that the juvenile wishes to exercise his right to
remain silent. If the underlying reason for extend-
ing a per se rule is that the particular request is
prima facie evidence of the youth's invocation of
his rights,s the rule could reasonably be extended
to cover such requests even though not all youths
would take advantage of the rule by looking to
their probation officer for help.
Moreover, California has specifically encouraged
a juvenile to depend on his probation officer for
help. For example, under the California Welfare
& Institutions Code, the probation officer has a
wide variety of duties including representing the
interests of the child in court,' providing services
to keep the minor's family together, 1 handling the
minor's funds,72 and authorizing the sale of a
ward's handiwork." Specifically, in Fare, Michael's
probation officer attempted to act as a buffer
between Michael and police.74 The Supreme
Court's emphasis on the crucial and unique role of
" Id. at 422 (citing Ferster & Courtless, The Beginning
ofJuvenileJustice, Police Practices and the Juvenile Offender, 22
VAND. L, REv. 567, 578-79 (1969):
Ferster and Courtless' article on the disposition of
arrested juveniles shows that one of the most critical
factors determining how a child's case will be han-
dled is the impression he makes on police when he
is detained. Nearly half of the minors arrested never
reach either juvenile or criminal court, but are
either released or referred to welfare or police agen-
cies.
Id.
69This assumption is implicit in the California Su-
preme Court's opinion. See In re Michael C., 21 Cal. 3d
471, 146 Cal. Rptr. 358, 579 P.2d 7 (1978). The U.S.
Supreme Court did not adopt this rationale for extending
a per se rule. The Court stated: "It is [the] pivotal role of
legal counsel that justifies the per se rule established in
Miranda .... "99 S. Ct. at 2570.
70 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 280 (West 1978).
7' Id. § 272.5.
7Id. § 276.
73 Id. § 277.
74 See 21 Cal. 3d at 477, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 361, 579 P.2d
at 10.
an attorney, 5 as opposed to that of a probation
officer, in protecting a juvenile's rights ignores
these facts and assumes that a juvenile justice
system could not be constructed in which a non-
attorney would be effective in safeguarding these
rights. The Court also necessarily assumes, without
citing any supporting evidence, that a probation
officer would not advise the youth to get an attor-
ney.
Another reason that the Court distinguished a
request for an attorney is the traditional rule that
statements made by the juvenile to his attorney are
protected by the attorney-client privilege, whereas
statements to a probation officer are not.76 The
California Supreme Court removed that distinc-
tion recently when it held that statements to a
probation officer are privileged.7 The California
decision was another step in promoting a trusting
and candid relationship between juveniles and
their probation officers. As a result of the Fare
decision, the California courts will not have the
option of strengthening that relationship through
a liberal interpretation of Miranda.
On. the other hand, despite the necessity for
special protection of juveniles, even a broad read-
ing of Miranda may not require more than a totality
of the circumstances approach. The knowledge and
experience of juvenile offenders varies so widely78
that a per se standard is arguably inappropriate,
because it does not provide a flexible test. A flexible
standard is consistent with the analysis of the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court. For example, that court
stated:
7599 S. Ct. at 2568-71.
76 1d. at 2569.
77 In re Wayne H., 24 Cal. 3d 595, 156 Cal. Rptr. 344,
596 P.2d 1 (1979). The court ruled in that case that
statements made by a minor to his probation officer were
privileged because policy required complete candor by
the youth so that the officer would have all available
information to make a recommendation to the court
under § 626 of the California Welfare & Institutions
Code.
"Justice Powell pointed out that
Minors who become embroiled with the law range
from very young up to those on the brink of major-
ity. Some of the older minors become fully 'street-
wise,' hardened criminals, deserving no greater con-
sideration than that properly accorded all persons
suspected of crime. Other minors are more of a child
than an adult. As the Court indicated in In re
Gault,... the facts relevant to the care to be exer-
cised in a particular case vary widely.
99 S. Ct. at 2576 n.4. (Powell, J., dissenting)(citation
omitted),
19791
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In view of the emphasis which the juvenile court
system places upon the close relationship between a
minor and his probation officer, and in light of the
probation officer's instructions in the present case
that his ward contact him immediately in case of
trouble, the 'normal reaction' of the minor here
would be to request consultation with his probation
officer.79
The California Supreme Court's analysis is argua-
bly more appropriate to a totality of the circum-
stances approach than a per se rule insofar as it
takes into account the subjective needs for the
individual defendant, Michael C. Miranda and
Burton apply the objective per se approach only
after asserting that all persons so subjected are in
need of protective safeguards. Theoretically, any
situation requiring per se protection would be sub-
sumed under the protection of a totality of the
circumstances test.
An extension of per se requirements to a request
for a probation officer would also present line-
drawing problems. Some youths look to other
adults in much the same way that an adult looks
to an attorney in a custodial interrogation. The
court of appeals stated: "While such extension
might, at first blush, appear logical, we believe a
line must be drawn before a request for consulta-
tion with one's football coach, music teacher or
clergyman, be deemed to invoke Fifth Amendment
privileges."8' A per se rule would have to be ex-
tended to all possible situations in which a youth
makes a similar request if all juveniles are to be
protected equally.
The California Supreme Court attempted to
differentiate probation officers from other adults to
whom the juvenile might turn for help, by citing
the special statutory dutiesst of probation officers
in California.82 Under Section 280 of the California
Welfare & Institutions Code, "the probation officer
shall be present in court to represent the interests
of each person who is the subject of a petition."
'8
This statutory provision does not remove the line-
drawing problems, however. Juveniles do not con-
sider statutes when they seek advice from a trusted
adult, with the result that a request for a probation
79 21 Cal. 3d at 476, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 361, 579 P.2d at
9, 10.
"o 135 Cal Rptr. at 766. The Supreme Court in Fare
also recognized the problem. 99 S. Ct. at 2571.
s See note 28 and accompanying text supra.
8221 Cal. 3d at 477, 99 Cal Rptr. at 361, 579 P.2d at
10. W CAL. WELF. & INST. CoDE § 280 (West 1976).
officer is no more probative of a desire to discon-
tinue interrogation than is a request for some other
adult friend.
Arguably, however, the Court in Fare was not
faithful to its own voluntariness standard. The
facts related in the majority and dissenting opin-
ions do not clearly indicate that under all the
circumstances Michael C. actually waived his
rights voluntarily.8 4 While it is inappropriate for
the Court to review the trial court's factual conclu-
sions, it must ensure that proper legal standards
were applied. The burden of proof which the state
must meet is one of these legal standards. In defin-
ing the state's burden to show that effective waiver
was made, the Court in Miranda said:
If the interrogation continues without the presence
of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy
burden rests on the government to demonstrate that
the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived
his privilege against self-incrimination and his right
to retained or appointed counsel.... This Court has
always set high standards of proof for the waiver of
constitutional rights,... and we re-assert these stan-
dards as applied to in-custody interrogation. Since
the State is responsible for establishing the isolated
circumstances under which the interrogation takes
place and has the only means of making available
corroborated evidence of warnings given during in-
communicado interrogation, the burden is rightly
on its shouldersm
The Court in Fare makes no mention of this heavy
burden of proof, either to apply or to modify it.
The Supreme Court has not indicated that it is
ready to abandon this standard, however. As it
stated recently in North Carolina v. Butler,1 "[tihe
courts must presume that a defendant did not
waive his rights; the prosecution's burden is great;
but in at least some cases waiver can be clearly
inferred from the actions and words of the person
interrogated. '" 8 7 In actuality this strict standard
may have little real force today. The Commentary
to the ALl Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure
states: "This 'heavy burden' requirement is alluded
84 Michael was crying during part of the interrogation,
99 S. Ct. at 2573, and he did not trust police to get a
bonafide attorney, see text accompanying note 17 supra.
On the other hand, he was a 16-year-old with a long
history of contact with police procedures. Moreover, the
trial judge, who was presumably in the best position to
evaluate the evidence, concluded that the waiver was
voluntary.
"5 384 U.S. at 475.
8699 S. Ct. 1755 (1979).
8
7 ld. at 1757.
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to by the appellate courts, but does not appear to
have been applied in practice.... [W]hile waiver
will still not be found from a completely empty
record, it will be found from a nod or a shrug. ' ' 8
In view of the absence of any guidelines in Fare,
states will probably continue to have wide latitude
in finding that a defendant has waived his rights.
CONCLUSION
The Court is unlikely to enforce Miranda strictly
in the near future. In fact, the Court reserved the
question of whether Miranda rights apply at all in
juvenile proceedings. On the other hand, states
desiring more stringent safeguards against coerced
confessions, such as per se protection or a higher
burden of proof under a totality of the circum-
stances approach, are not necessarily constrained
by the Court's ruling in Fare. As the Court pointed
out in Oregon v. Hass, 9 while states cannot construe
" ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE
161 Commentary (1974).
8 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
the federal Constitution more strictly than the
Supreme Court, they are free to interpret similar
provisions in their own law more restrictively. 9° If
the states choose to exercise.their power to interpret
the self-incrimination provisions of their own con-
stitution more strictly the net result will be a varied
application of standards of waiver where an ex-
plicit request for an attorney is not made. The
circumstances in which a waiver will be recognized
will be different in each jurisdiction.
The Fare decision is a clear indication that the
Court will be unlikely to extend per se protection
where a defendant requests to see anyone except
an attorney, even in a juvenile case. Rather, a
totality of the circumstances approach will be ap-
plied. It appears that, under this standard, the
state's burden of proof in demonstrating adequate
waiver will continue to be a matter of the lower
court's discretion. Juveniles will have to look to a
source other than the federal Constitution for strict
procedural safeguards.
90Id. at 719.
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